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ABSTRACT: This article surveys risk factors for genocide and genocide prevention from 
the perspectives of four social science disciplines: sociology, social psychology, political 
science, and economics. Each discipline brings a valuable set of concepts and tools to 
bear in genocide research. Moreover, fruitful multi- and inter-disciplinary collaboration 
across the four disciplines (and other fields) is shedding new insights into why genocide 
has have been such a recurring tragedy in human affairs and how such atrocities can be 
prevented.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 When people hear the word genocide, they often think of the Holocaust 
(1933-1945) in which leaders in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied Europe fostered the 
extermination of roughly six million Jews and millions more across other groups (e.g., 
Roma, Soviet prisoners of war, Poles, religious objectors, homosexuals, handicapped). 
In the 1950s, research attempting to explain why the Holocaust occurred began to 
emerge. Much of the early research suggested the Holocaust happened because Nazi 
leaders and other perpetrators suffered from psychopathology (i.e., they were “mad”), had 
corrupted personalities (i.e., they were “bad”), and/or were products of a deeply 
embedded anti-Semitic culture (i.e., extreme ideology) (Gilbert 1950, Dicks 1950, Waller 
2007, chapters 1-4). Waller (2007) characterizes this early view of the Holocaust as the 
“extraordinary origins of extraordinary evil,” which I label simply as the “Bad Nazi Thesis.”  
 A major problem with the “Bad Nazi Thesis” is that genocides are not rare. 
Since the end of World War II, more than 40 genocides and at least 100 non-genocidal 
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forms of large-scale intentional killings of civilians, known as mass killings, have been 
documented (Anderton 2016). If genocide and other forms of mass atrocity require 
uncommon personalities and/or unusually extreme ideologies, why are they such an 
ordinary feature of human behavior? A second major problem with the “Bad Nazi Thesis” 
is that new research in the 1970s and 1980s painted a distinctly different picture of the 
origins of the Holocaust and other genocides. Led by sociologists (e.g., Helen Fein, Leo 
Kuper), social psychologists (Israel Charny, Ervin Staub), political scientists (e.g., Barbara 
Harff, Robert Melson), and historians (e.g., Rouben Paul Adalian, Christopher Browning), 
the new research emphasized the “ordinary origins of extraordinary evil” (Waller 2007, 
chapters 5-8). In this new paradigm, the architects and perpetrators of the Holocaust and 
other genocides seemed to be ordinary people; they scored within normal ranges on 
standard personality tests and their behaviors, outside of atrocity perpetration, in such 
contexts as family life and community relations were normal and even commendable (see 
personal case histories of perpetrators in Waller 2007). The new research also highlighted 
the goal orientations of genocide architects and perpetrators, which varied considerably, 
but nonetheless implied that the conception and execution of various phases of mass 
atrocity could serve strategic purposes and in this sense be seen as “rational.”  
 The objective of this article is to highlight perspectives from the social 
sciences into the “ordinary” and even “rational” origins of genocides and how they might 
be prevented.2 Many social science disciplines, as well as disciplines in the humanities 
(e.g., history, languages, philosophy, religion, visual arts) and sciences (e.g., biology, 
neurobiology, psychopathology), provide valuable insights into genocidal behavior, but it 
is beyond the scope of this article to survey such a breadth of literature. Instead, I focus 
upon critical insights into genocide risk and prevention from four social science 
disciplines: sociology, social psychology, political science, and economics. Even within 
                                                          
2 The notion of “ordinary” and “rational” origins of genocide in no way implies that genocide is reasonable. 
Obviously, such atrocities are horrific and should be condemned. When social scientists and other 
scholars seek to understand the motives of genocide perpetrators, the motives discovered do not justify 
the actions of the perpetrators. In a similar manner, police detectives seek to identify the motives of 
suspects in murder investigations, not to justify the motives of the murderer but to find the perpetrator 
and bring her or him to justice. Moreover, by better understanding the motives of genocide perpetrators, 
scholars, policymakers, and activists can hopefully reduce the number and seriousness of such 
atrocities in the future.    
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this limited set of disciplines, given space constraints, my surveys must be selective and 
brief.  
The essay is organized as follows. The next two sections cover definitions and 
data patterns of genocides and mass killings. The subsequent section surveys key ideas 
on genocide risk from sociology, social psychology, political science, and economics. The 
four disciplines are not separate silos for studying genocide because many of the key 
aspects of genocidal behavior have multiple and reinforcing wellsprings emanating from 
conditions that are studied within these disciplines. Hence, the four disciplinary viewpoints 
also point to fruitful interdisciplinary perspectives for understanding genocide. The 
concluding section sums up with several thoughts on the disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
study of genocide and its prevention. 
 
DEFINITIONS OF GENOCIDE AND OTHER MASS ATROCITIES  
 
In his seminal 1944 book on the Holocaust, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 
Raphael Lemkin combined the Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing) 
to form a new word: genocide. In its briefest form, genocide means to kill or destroy a 
people group. Lemkin, however, spent chapter 9 of his ground-breaking book, and really 
the whole book, explaining how much he meant by the term genocide. For example, 
Lemkin emphasized that genocide has two phases: (1) “destruction of the national pattern 
of the oppressed group” and (2) “imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” 
(Lemkin 1944, p. 79). Hence, genocide is not just the elimination of a people group, it also 
involves the flourishing of the oppressor group in place of (and at the expense of) the 
oppressed. Furthermore, genocide was a “synchronized attack” and a “coordinated plan 
of different actions” directed against an oppressed group’s existence (Lemkin 1944, pp. 
xi and 79). The synchronization and various actions of genocide struck across eight 
dimensions or “fields” in which group elimination was accomplished: 
 
[I]n the political field (by destroying institutions of self-government and imposing 
a German pattern of administration, and through colonization by Germans); in the 
social field (by disrupting the social cohesion of the nation involved and killing or 
removing elements such as the intelligentsia …); in the cultural field (by 
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prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and cultural activities; by substituting 
vocational education for education in the liberal arts …); in the economic field (by 
shifting wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the exercise of trades and 
occupations by people who do not promote Germanism “without reservations”); 
in the biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by promoting procreation 
by Germans in occupied countries); in the field of physical existence (by 
introducing a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass killings 
…); in the religious field (by interfering with the activities of the Church …); in the 
field of morality (by attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement …) 
(Lemkin (1944, pp. xi-xii). 
 
Among the many critical aspects of Lemkin’s conceptualization of genocide are 
three that I emphasize: (1) genocide is multifaceted; it is an assault upon many, and in 
some cases all, of the eight essential foundations of a people group’s existence; (2) 
genocide does not necessarily imply outright physical killing, although it usually does; 
nevertheless, a targeted group can be eliminated by prohibiting its procreation and/or 
destroying its culture, institutions, and religion and forcing it to assimilate into the 
dominant group; and (3) the nature and actions of genocide plague so many aspects of 
human life that perspectives from multiple disciplines are not just desirable, but essential, 
for understanding genocide risk and prevention.   
It was Lemkin’s dream to see genocide become a punishable crime in international 
law and he worked tirelessly toward that end through the United Nations, political leaders, 
and other organizations (Waller 2016). In December 1948, the United Nations established 
genocide as a crime under international law. In Article II of the 1948 United Nations (UN) 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, genocide is 
defined as  
 
…any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the 
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) 
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group (United Nations 1948). 
  
Note that the dimensions of genocide under Lemkin’s conceptualization 
are much broader than the Convention’s. The Convention focuses on the physical 
destruction of an oppressed group such as killing, serious bodily harm, and 
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physical destruction (see parts a-c). Certainly physical destruction of a people 
group is critical in Lemkin’s conception of genocide, but the “physical” is just one 
of Lemkin’s eight fields. 
A large literature analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptions of 
genocide offered by Lemkin and the Convention including criticisms regarding groups left 
out (e.g., political groups), difficulties with proving intent, and the inability of the 
Convention to prevent genocide. Many scholars have proposed their own definitions of 
genocide and other civilian atrocity concepts. For example, some scholars distinguish 
genocide and mass killing where genocide is the targeting of a group for destruction 
based on the group’s characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, race, religion) and mass killing is 
civilian destruction without a clear designation of group membership or where the 
intention to eliminate the group as such is absent (Staub 1989, p. 8; Waller 2007, p. 14). 
Other scholars, however, maintain that distinguishing genocide and mass killing runs into 
difficulties regarding perpetrator intentions or characteristics of targeted groups so that it 
is not fruitful for research to distinguish the two (see, e.g., Ulfelder and Valentino 2008). 
Still others argue that the term genocide does not need to be distinguished from other 
forms of intentional violence against civilians “because genocide gives us a framework 
for bringing together the varied phenomena of anti-civilian violence and understanding 
the relationships among them” (Shaw 2003, p. 153). To complicate matters further, there 
are other atrocity crimes distinct from but often associated with genocide including war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Following Anderton and Brauer 
(2016b), I categorize genocide, mass killing, and other atrocity crimes under the broad 
category of mass atrocities.3 A continuing challenge for genocide research is how to 
conceptualize genocide and when to distinguish it from and integrate it with other forms 
of atrocities against civilians.  
                                                          
3  According to Anderton and Brauer (2016b), “Crimes against humanity are systematic attacks against 
civilians involving inhumane means such as extermination, forcible population transfer, torture, rape, 
and disappearances. War crimes are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions including willful killing, 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, 
and torture. Ethnic cleansing is the removal of a particular group of people from a state or region using 
such means as forced migration and/or mass killing (Pégorier 2013). Ethnic cleansing is not, however, 
defined as an atrocity crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.” For reviews of 
mass atrocity definitions and controversies see Curthoys and Docker (2008), Meierhenrich (2014, pp. 
56-104), and Waller (2016). 
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PATTERNS OF GENOCIDES AND MASS KILLINGS  
 
Figure 1 shows the number of states perpetrating genocides and mass atrocities 
(genocides and mass killings) per year over the period 1956-2014. A key message of 
Figure 1 is that for the almost 60 years covered by the genocide data there were one or 
more genocides in the world each year with the exception of 2012. Furthermore, for the 
mass atrocity data there were at least two, and often far more than two, mass atrocities 
in the world each year.  
Figure 2 shows estimated fatalities from selected state-perpetrated post-World 
War II genocides. The data are extremely disturbing when considering that the victims of 
such atrocities are noncombatant civilians, including children and the elderly along with 
male and female adults. Moreover, such fatalities sometimes occur after severe brutalities 
were inflicted on the victims including rape, torture, and coercing people to rape or kill 
family members (von Joeden-Forgey 2016). Furthermore, according to Anderton (2016), 
estimated fatalities totaled over only three of the genocides in Figure 2 (Cambodia 1975-
1979, Pakistan 1971, and Sudan 1983-2002) surpasses the total estimated military 
fatalities for the 239 civil (intrastate) wars fought over the period 1900 to 2014. Anderton 
also documents that about as many people were killed in six weeks during the 1994 
Rwandan genocide (estimated to be 315,000) as died in all worldwide international and 
domestic terrorist incidents from 1970 to 2014 (estimated to be 307,000).  
Figures 1 and 2 focus on mass atrocities perpetrated by states, but nonstate 
groups perpetrate atrocities too. Anderton (2016) documents about three dozen nonstate 
groups that carried out mass atrocities within the 1989 to 2014 period. Furthermore, the 
only dataset that specifically tracks genocides, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), 
has designated the Islamic State as a perpetrator of genocide in its 2014 update 
(Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015). This is the first time that PITF has identified a nonstate 
group as the main perpetrator of genocide. 
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FIGURE 1 – Number of state-perpetrated genocides and mass atrocities by year, 1956-2014 
 
SOURCES: Adapted from Anderton (2016) and sources therein and Marshall, Gurr, and Harff (2015) 
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FIGURE 2 – Estimated fatalities from selected state-perpetrated post-World War II genocides 
 
SOURCE:  Midpoint fatality estimates based on the Political Instability Task Force geno-politicide dataset (Marshall, Gurr, 
and Harff 2015) 
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Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 imply that genocides and mass killings occur 
quite frequently in human affairs. The number of such atrocities is counted per year rather 
than per decade. Imagine if the number of major airline crashes in a year was eight or 
ten; the flying public would be in a state of fear and rightly so. And yet, the average number 
of mass atrocities (genocides and mass killings) present per year in the world since 1956 
is 24, and such incidents correspond to fatalities, not in the hundreds, but often in the tens 
or hundreds of thousands. It is as if the international community and people generally are 
numb to the devastation wrought by mass atrocities. Another truly disturbing aspect 
implied by Figures 1 and 2 is that many “ordinary” people must participate for mass 
atrocities to occur. Outside of major city bombing campaigns or weapons of mass 
destruction (e.g., nuclear, biological weapons), it is not possible for a small group of 
leaders to kill thousands or even millions of civilians. Such atrocities require that 
thousands of perpetrators go along with the desires of genocide architects for such 
devastation to occur. Such people cannot, for the most part, be psychopathological 
because psychopathology is relatively rare. Hence, one of the great challenges of 
genocide research is to understand how ordinary people can be swept up into 
perpetrating, or not resisting, genocide and mass killing. The social sciences provide 
important insights into these and other disturbing aspects of mass atrocities, to which I 
now turn. 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON GENOCIDE FROM SELECTED SOCIAL SCIENCE 
DISCIPLINES  
 
SOCIOLOGY 
 
Shaw (2010, p. 142) characterizes genocide as a “peculiarly sociological crime” 
because the very nature of genocide is one in which social classification is manipulated, 
distorted, and perverted against one or more groups by atrocity architects and other 
perpetrators. Until the late 1970s, the discipline of sociology did not recognize genocide 
as a phenomenon that should be analyzed in sociological terms. The neglect was due, in 
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part, to the discipline’s unwillingness to look at extreme human behavior including “evil” 
(Shaw 2010, p. 144).  
Pioneering research on the Holocaust and genocide by sociologists Helen Fein 
(1979, 1993), Leo Kuper (1977, 1981), and Zygmunt Bauman (1989) opened the door to 
the sociological study of genocide. Such research has contributed to greater 
understanding of what genocide is and is not and, most significantly, to the roles that 
social categorization, structure, and processes play in precipitating genocide. One of the 
distinctive contributions of the early sociological research on genocide was to show how 
a people group within a broader society could come to be designated as “alien” or “other” 
by political leaders in a society. In extreme cases of such “othering,” people from the out-
group would, to use Fein’s phrase, “fall outside the universe of moral obligation” of the 
dominant group. When people from the out-group are so designated, they are often 
treated discriminatorily and may come to be treated murderously by people from the 
dominant group.  
In-group/out-group discrimination exists just about everywhere, so the key issue is 
not the existence of “othering” per se, but the circumstances in which it can become so 
extreme that it crosses into genocide. The early sociologists maintained, as do virtually 
all genocide scholars today, that there is not one path or formula by which genocide 
breaks out and spreads. Rather, there are various enabling circumstances that can foster 
genocide. Moreover, genocide often emerges in phases in which the initial goals of the 
perpetrators do not include outright extermination of the victim group. Two key questions 
for the early sociologists (and they remain highly relevant today) were: (1) What social 
factors and conditions cause a people group to become an out-group? (2) What are the 
enabling circumstances that cause mistreatment of the out-group to cross into genocide? 
It is beyond the scope of this article to survey in detail the work of the early sociologist on 
these two questions. Instead, I provide a brief overview of the thinking of two early 
sociologists on the questions: Helen Fein and Leo Kuper. 
Fein (1979, pp. 8-10) maintains that the outing of a people group can benefit a 
state’s political leaders when it increases the state’s legitimacy and the dominant group’s 
control of the state. Such “benefits” are most likely to arise when the state is weak 
internally (e.g., low solidarity among various in- groups) and has suffered past defeats in 
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war and losses of territory. The out-group being identified as outside the universe of the 
in-group’s moral obligation, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
genocide. If this outing is combined with current defeats in war and internal strife in which 
a “political or cultural crisis of national identity” emerges, the risk of genocide increases 
(Fein 1979, p. 9). The genocide risk is further magnified if the political elite adopts a new 
formula or narrative to justify and solidify its political control and the potential cost of brutal 
treatment of the out-group is low (owing, for example, to a low probability that third parties 
would intervene on behalf of the out-group). Such conditions can vary from case to case 
and even within a given nation over time, giving rise the phenomenon of genocide 
emerging in “fits and starts” or not emerging when it seemed likely it would. Nevertheless, 
Fein’s conditions represent an “explanatory sketch” of genocide that can be applied 
across many historical and potential future cases of mass atrocity. 
Kuper’s (1977, 1981) early sociological research on genocide also contains 
perspectives that remain highly relevant in genocide studies today. Among his many 
insights into the causes of genocide and the failures of the international community to 
prevent mass atrocities are his analyses of social processes of exclusion of an out-group 
and how these can lead to the rationalization of mass murder in the minds of perpetrators. 
Kuper (1977) describes how a society can move to the point in which there is deep 
polarization between a dominant in-group and a socially constructed out-group in which 
the stage is set for genocide:  
 
Polarisation may be a deliberate policy, or an unpremeditated consequence of 
strategies pursued. There are certain clichés of action, almost involuntary 
idiomatic actions, which feed into the process of polarization. Action and reaction, 
premeditated and involuntary, may so intermesh as to move violence to higher 
levels of destruction through escalating cycles of polarisation (Kuper 1977, p. 
127). 
 
The movement of violence to higher levels can cause key perpetrators from the 
in-group to cross a point of no return in which genocidal actions become socially “normal” 
and even rewarding (e.g., through perpetrators’ career advancement and looting of 
victims assets). At its worst, polarizing violence leads not only to extremes of brutality 
such as the torture and mass murder of children, women, men, and the elderly, but such 
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actions are seen as necessary and even “good” for society. When the point of no return 
is crossed, the dominant group becomes “locked in” to a program of destruction of the 
out-group such that moderate voices for peace are excluded: 
 
By the middle ground, I refer to those relationships between people of different 
racial, religious or ethnic background, and those ideologies, which might form the 
basis for movements of inter-group cooperation and of radical change, without 
resort to destructive violence. Where the carriers of these ideologies are 
significant in number or power, the process of polarisation requires that they be 
appreciably recruited or coerced into one or other of the warring camps, and that 
the irreducible minority is either silenced or eliminated, at the same time that its 
ideologies of conciliation are discredited (Kuper 1977, p. 209). 
 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
As noted above in Figure 2, the number of people killed in genocides is often in 
the tens or hundreds of thousands and, in some cases, in the millions. It is not possible 
(outside of city bombing campaigns or weapons of mass destruction) for a small number 
of genocide architects to kill such a large number of victims. Rather, it takes many people 
to become perpetrators of genocide for thousands or millions of people from the out-group 
to be killed. For example, it is estimated that between 100,000 and 500,000 people 
actively participated in the murder of six million Jews during the Holocaust (Waller 2007, 
p. 16). For the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which about 750,000 people were murdered, 
Straus (2004) estimates that between 175,000 and 210,000 people actively participated 
in the killing. Since psychopathology is relatively rare, most genocide scholars reach the 
disturbing conclusion that “ordinary people” (i.e., people like you and me) must get caught 
up in social processes and cognitive states in which they become willing to perpetrate, or 
refuse to resist, genocide. How can this be? 
Social psychologists have added a great deal to our understanding of genocide 
perpetration by ordinary people. Such explanations hinge on the distinction between what 
Roth (2010, p. 199) calls situationism and dispositionalism. Under situationism, situational 
variables (e.g., a person’s immediate social settings such as neighborhood and 
workplace) affect individual and group behavior. Dispositionalism focuses on the internal 
dispositions of individuals (e.g., whether a person is aggressive or welcoming toward 
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people from other groups). Among social psychologists who do research on genocide, 
many lean strongly in the direction of situationism to explain how ordinary people become 
perpetrators. For example, Waller (2007, p. 269) states that evil behavior is “a product of 
situational influences that channel action in particular directions.” Similarly, Roth (2010, 
p. 199) indicates that “situational variables most often prove determinative of individual 
and group behavior.” 
 According to Roth (2010, p. 199), the key factor that defines a person’s 
situation is “the group or social norms that implicitly or explicitly govern expected behavior 
in the situation.” Hence, many individuals who find themselves in a situation in which the 
social norms and expectations are to discriminate against a people group, and even to 
have such people “cleansed” from the social group, will come to participate in, or not 
resist, such norms. Tragically, such situational pressures to conform to the genocide 
architects’ wishes by explicitly participating in genocide or looking the other way occur in 
all genocides and for thousands of ordinary people. 
Application of the situationist perspective to understanding genocide perpetration 
is built upon several path-breaking experiments in social psychology, especially those of 
Asch (1951), Milgram (1963), and Zimbardo (1971). The Asch experiment reveals a 
surprising degree of conformity to an experimentally-contrived erroneous group norm. 
Figure 3 shows the information presented to subjects in the experiment. Each subject 
was given the two cards shown in the figure. The line on the first card is the exact length 
of line C on the second card, but the subjects were not told this. Each subject was asked 
to state out loud which line on the second card matched the length of the line on the first 
card. Various trials of eight male college students participated in each run of the 
experiment, but only one of the eight was a true subject of the experiment. Seven of the 
eight recruits were “actors” employed by Asch to construct an erroneous group norm in 
order to study the behavior of the one true subject per trial. In each trial, the seven actors 
would choose in turn the matching line on the right card and then the true subject would 
choose last. In some trials the seven actors would unanimously choose the correct line 
C, but in other trials they would unanimously choose the same incorrect line. For the trials 
in which the seven actors chose correctly, the rate of incorrect answers by subjects was 
less than one percent. For the incorrect trials, however, Asch found, that 36.8 percent of 
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subject choices conformed to the actors’ erroneous selection. Moreover, subjects 
participated in multiple trials and Asch found that 75 percent of subjects gave at least one 
wrong answer in the incorrect trials in which they participated. The Asch experiment 
revealed a conformity effect associated with situational variables that was not good news 
when thinking about genocide. If, owing to situational variables, subjects could be prone 
to making erroneous choices when the costs of doing so were small, how much more 
might they go along with or look the other way when tyrannous leaders demanded 
conformity (through threats and rewards) to their genocidal aims.  
 
FIGURE 3 – Pairs of cards used in the Asch conformity experiment 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Based on Asch (1951) 
 
Another foundational experiment in the situationist paradigm of social psychology 
is Milgram (1963). The experiment involved three individuals: an “actor” pretending to be 
a subject in the experiment, a person in a white coat who ran the experiment (the 
“authority” figure), and a true experimental subject. The actor was given the role of learner 
in the experiment and the subject was a teacher who was directed to follow the orders of 
the authority figure running the experiment. The subject believed that the assignment to 
the roles of learner and teacher was random, but actually the assignment was rigged so 
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that the actor would be the learner and the subject the teacher. After the role assignments, 
the actor (learner) and subject (teacher) were placed in separate rooms where they could 
hear but not see each other. Prior to the actual running of the experiment, the subject was 
told that the learner had a heart condition and the subject was given a relatively mild 
sample electric shock to experience what a low-level shock would supposedly be like for 
the learner. In actuality, the learner did not receive any real shocks, only pretend ones to 
see how the unknowing subject would react. The authority figure instructed the subject to 
read a pair of words to the learner. The subject was told to then read the first word of 
each pair and four possible answers, one of which aligned with the second word in the 
pair. The learner would press a button to indicate which of the four possible answers 
aligned with the second word in the pair. A correct answer would cause the subject to 
move to the next word pair and repeat the exercise. An incorrect answer would be met 
with a slight shock of 15 volts at first, but increasing by 15 volts for each subsequent 
incorrect answer. The actor-learner was pre-instructed to answer incorrectly with enough 
frequency that the volts administered by the subject would escalate to higher levels, even 
those clearly labeled to the subject as severe. 
Table 1 summarizes the intensity of shocks (ranging from 15 to 450 volts) that 
subjects believed were in play during the experiment and the choices that the subjects 
made to administer shocks at the direction of the authority figure. Prior to running the 
experiment, Milgram polled 14 Yale University senior psychology majors to gauge their 
expectation of the percent of subjects in the experiment that would eventually choose the 
highest level of shock (450 volts, labeled in the XXX range in Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 – Shock levels chosen in Milgram obedience experiment 
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Shock Level Knowingly 
Administered By Subject 
(In Volts) 
Number Of Subjects (Out Of 
40) For Whom This Was The 
Maximum Shock 
Slight Shock  
  15 0 
  30 0 
  45 0 
  60 0 
Moderate Shock  
  75 0 
  90 0 
105 0 
120 0 
Strong Shock  
135 0 
150 0 
165 0 
180 0 
Very Strong Shock  
195 0 
210 0 
225 0 
240 0 
Intense Shock  
255 0 
270 0 
285 0 
300 5 
Extreme Intensity Shock  
315 4 
330 2 
345 1 
360 1 
Danger: Severe Shock  
375 1 
390 0 
405 0 
420 0 
XXX  
435 0 
450 26 
                                        N=40 
SOURCE: Milgram (1963, p. 376) 
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The mean response was that out of 100 subjects, 1.2 percent would eventually 
choose the highest level. The most “pessimistic” of the Yale seniors predicted that 3 
percent would go that high. Milgram found, however, that of the 40 subjects who 
participated in the experiment, all selected at least an intense degree of shock (300 volts 
or more) and 26 of the 40 (65 percent) chose the highest level of shock (450 volts). The 
results were all the more surprising when considering that as the experiment moved into 
higher levels of voltage, the actor-learner (who was not receiving real shocks) shrieked 
and screamed in ways that could be heard by the subject. Even under these conditions 
of apparent suffering, subjects continued to administer higher levels of shock because an 
authority figure in a white coat told them that it was important that they continue. If, owing 
to obedience to authority, subjects could choose to impose suffering when the cost of 
refusing to harm was so low, how much more might people be prone to obey the authority 
of tyrannous leaders who can bring substantial penalties to bear on those who refuse to 
go along with their genocidal aims.   
A third foundational experiment in the situationist paradigm of social psychology 
is the Stanford Prison Experiment (SPE) on power relations between guards and 
prisoners (Zimbardo 1971). The experiment randomly assigned 24 subjects to the roles 
of prisoner and guard in a mock prison situation that was supposed to play out over a 
period of two weeks. Zimbardo and his research team found that those assigned to the 
role of guard came to act in strongly authoritarian ways including subjecting the prisoners 
to physical punishment and psychological torture. Meanwhile, some of the prisoners 
submitted to the abuse while others revolted. Owing to the escalating abuse against the 
prisoners, the experiment was stopped after just six days. The behavioral extremes 
revealed in the experiment, which surprised Zimbardo and the others on his research 
team, suggested that it was not the personalities of the guards (i.e., their dispositions), 
but the situations that the guards were in that facilitated their oppressive actions. Such 
positioning of in-group authorities in dominance over those designated as an out-group 
lies at the core of genocidal actions of extreme discrimination, including murder. The 
disturbing result of the experiment is that ordinary people can come to “legitimize” in their 
own minds such abusive behavior because they are (1) in a position of authority, (2) face 
no social or institutional context restraining them, and (3) can cognitively learn to ignore 
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the dissonance that might otherwise arise in their minds indicating that what they are 
doing is wrong. 
 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
As a discipline, political science did not really move into genocide research until 
the 1990s. According to Straus (2010, p. 167), the end of the Cold War in 1990 and a 
series of high profile civil wars and genocides in the 1990s and the early 2000s (e.g., 
Balkan wars and mass atrocities in the mid-to-late 1990s, Rwanda civil war and genocide 
in 1990-1994, atrocities in Sudan/Darfur beginning in the early 2000s) fostered growing 
interest by political scientists in genocide research. Further interest within the field was 
fueled by the UN Security Council’s formation of a special advisor on genocide prevention 
in 2004, development of the Responsibility to Protect norm at the 2005 UN World Summit, 
and release of a genocide prevention report in 2008 by a team of scholars and 
policymakers led by former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and former US 
Secretary of Defense, William Cohen (Albright and Cohen 2008, Straus 2010, pp. 167-
168). 
 Among the many important research avenues brought to the study of 
genocide by political scientists are four highlighted by Straus (2010, p. 168): (1) 
comparative study of genocide, (2) importance of regime type (e.g., autocracy, anocracy, 
democracy, transitioning regime type) in understanding genocide, (3) rationalist 
explanations of genocide, and (4) connections between war and genocide. Political 
scientists also promoted the application of quantitative methods in genocide research 
including formal game theory models and assessments of genocide risk using statistical 
methods.   
 An important example of comparative genocide research in political science 
is Melson (1992), who compared and contrasted the Armenian genocide (1915-1918) and 
the Holocaust. Among Melson’s key results was how, in each case, revolution prior to 
genocide divided people into in-groups and out-groups and the emergence of a new war 
increased the risk that out-groups would be seen as enemies of the state and targeted 
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for extermination (Straus 2010, p. 170). Many other political scientists followed in 
Melson’s footsteps and studied multiple cases of genocide and mass killing comparatively 
(see, e.g., Valentino 2004 and Midlarsky 2005).  
Another type of comparative research is to apply statistical methods to a large 
sample of countries to ascertain risk factors for genocide. Krain (1997), for example, 
statistically analyzed genocide risk factors for the perio201 1948 to 1982 based on a 
sample of about 4000 country-year observations containing 35 genocides. Krain found 
that civil war is a strong predictor of genocide onset and interstate war and periods of 
decolonization also increase risk. The most prominent empirical study of genocide risk in 
the literature is Harff (2003), who identified 126 countries that experienced state failure 
(e.g., regime collapse, civil war) at some point in the 1955 to 1997 period. Of the 126 
cases of state failure, 35 culminated in genocide. Conditioned on state failure, Harff’s 
statistical analysis identified six key risk factors for genocide: (1) magnitude of political 
upheaval, (2) history of prior genocide, (3) exclusionary ideology by the ruling elite, (4) 
autocratic regime, (5) ethnic minority elite, and (6) low trade openness. The empirical 
work of Krain and Harff were foundational to an emerging body of statistical research on 
genocide risk, conducted mostly by political scientists, which currently numbers about 
three dozen publications (for a review of this literature, see Hoeffler 2016). 
Many comparative case studies and, especially, empirical studies in political 
science find that non-democratic regimes (e.g., autocracy, anocracy) correlate to greater 
genocide risk. For example, according to Rummel (1998), autocracy is the major risk 
factor for genocide and other mass atrocities perpetrated by governments. Moreover, one 
of Harff’s six risk factors noted above is autocracy. But such results are subject to 
controversy among scholars. For example, many genocide and mass killing (GMK) 
samples used in empirical research focus on the post-World War II period. There is strong 
evidence that some democratic states committed or allowed GMKs in the past, for 
example, against native peoples. Such cases that occurred in earlier centuries or prior to 
World War II would not be part of the samples of modern empirical genocide research. 
Moreover, new empirical research is beginning to consider that it may not be regime type 
per se, but the transition of a political regime (e.g., transition from autocracy to anocracy 
and then to democracy), that may be most important for understanding genocide risk. For 
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example, Anderton and Carter (2105) found strong empirical evidence of an inverted-U 
relationship between regime type and genocide risk based on a sample of close to 200 
countries over the 1956-2006 period. Their result is summarized in Figure 4. The figure 
implies that, controlling for other factors, autocracies have a greater risk of genocide than 
democracies, but “in-between” political regimes (i.e., anocracies) have the greatest risk. 
An oft-cited goal in international affairs is to help states transition from autocracy to 
democracy. Figure 4 implies, however, that, everything else the same, such transitions 
will first move through anocracy in which genocide risk rises before it finally decreases in 
the democratic zone. Hence, pushing states from autocracy to democracy could initially 
elevate the GMK risk.  
 
FIGURE 4 – Regime type and genocide risk (inverted-u hypothesis) 
 
The figure shows that, controlling for other factors, autocracy is correlated with greater 
genocide risk than democracy, but intermediate regime types (i.e., anocracies) have the 
highest risk.  
 
SOURCE: Based on empirical results in Anderton and Carter (2015, pp. 20-22) 
 
 
Another important contribution by political scientists to the study of genocide is 
the consideration of the goals of genocide architects and the notion that their choice of 
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genocide can be “rational.” The word rational does not mean reasonable. In the social 
sciences, a rational decision is one in which the decisionmaker weighs the expected costs 
and benefits of various possible actions and choses an action designed to achieve the 
greatest feasible net benefit. A rational decision implies that the person has a motive in 
making her or his choice and is trying to achieve some objective. The choice could be 
horrific (e.g., murder, genocide), but if the choice is deliberately taken to achieve an 
objective, it is in this sense rational. One of the main motives for genocide and mass killing 
emphasized by political scientists is the strategic use of civilian extermination campaigns 
to increase or retain political power and/or territorial control when facing threats from 
internal enemies. For example, the political elite in a weakened regime may perceive that 
killing civilians would weaken a rebel group that is dependent on civilian support, compel 
civilians to align with the state to protect their lives, and/or cause other groups within the 
state to more strongly support the political elite (e.g., by being rewarded with looted assets 
from those designated as out-groups) (see, e.g., Valentino 2004, Midlarsky 2005, Kalyvas 
2006). 
Finally, we note the importance of political science research on connections 
between war and mass atrocity. Virtually all genocides and mass killings occur in the 
context of war, although the reverse does not hold (i.e., there are many wars in which 
mass atrocities do not occur). Furthermore, almost all empirical studies of genocide risk 
that include war as a risk assessment variable find a positive correlation between war and 
genocide risk (Hoeffler 2016). One of the main explanations for the elevated risk of 
genocide during war is that war typically challenges the ruling elite’s hold on political 
power. In many wars, especially civil wars, if the political elite loses, they will no longer 
have political power and may be incarcerated or executed. Hence, for the political elite, 
war can represent an existential threat. In extreme cases of existential threat, some 
political leaders have been willing to do just about anything to retain their hold on power, 
including carrying out atrocities against civilians. For more detailed analyses of 
connections between war and genocide, see Shaw (2003, 2007).   
 
ECONOMICS 
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Substantial research on genocide by economists has begun to emerge only within 
the last several years.70 Following Anderton and Brauer (2016b), Figure 5 highlights six 
critical ways in which genocides and mass killings (GMKs) are interconnected with 
economics as shown by the six boxes. Box 1 emphasizes the principle that GMKs are 
choices. As a social science devoted to the study of human choices, an extensive menu 
of theoretical models is available in economics (e.g., constrained optimization and game 
theory models) which can be applied to understand GMK choices and consequences. In 
economics, a distinction is often made between rational and nonrational motives 
underlying choices. Rational choice involves the purposeful weighing of expected costs 
and benefits by a decisionmaker over various feasible actions and the selection of the 
action that maximizes net benefits. Nonrational factors include social, psychological, and 
neurobiological phenomena that can cause choices to deviate from the strict predictions 
of rational choice theory. Box 2 implies that economic conditions (e.g., low per capita 
income, high unemployment) can affect the risk and seriousness of GMKs. The third box 
shows that GMKs can have significant economic effects via the “five Ds”: disruption of 
economic outcomes caused by GMK such as diminished growth; diversion of resources 
away from ordinary economic activities such as building roads and education into 
attacking civilians; displacement of people such as refugees or internally displaced people 
fleeing violence; destruction of people and property; and the difficulty of post-GMK 
development. Box 4 highlights the wealth appropriation aspect of GMKs, which includes 
looting victims’ assets (e.g., homes, jewelry) and bodies (e.g., enslavement, sexual 
exploitation) by genocide perpetrators. Box 5 shows that GMKs involve the application of 
business practices including efficient organization, supply chain and transportation 
management, resource acquisitions, and so on. Finally, the sixth box highlights that 
economies are critically dependent on underlying socioeconomic phenomena including 
security, health, and rule of law. When architects and perpetrators carry out GMK, they 
typically attack several, and often all, of these elements of a people group’s economic 
vitality.   
                                                          
70 For examples of early research on economic aspects of genocide see the citations in Anderton (2014, 
note 11). For more recent scholarship on genocide economics see the forthcoming 28-chapter edited 
volume on economic aspects of genocides and their prevention (Anderton and Brauer 2016a). 
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FIGURE 5 – Key economic aspects of genocides and mass killings 
 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from Anderton and Brauer (2016b) 
 
 
One of the most important developments in economics over the past half century 
has been the emergence of a new field within the discipline, namely behavioral 
economics, in which “insights from laboratory experiments, psychology, and other social 
sciences [are applied] in economics” in conjunction “with the standard economic [rational 
choice] model to get a better understanding” of human choices (Cartwright 2011, p. 4). 
Behavioral economics is a multi- and interdisciplinary field involving collaborative 
research among economists, social psychologists, psychologists, and others. There has 
been little application of the insights from behavioral economics to genocide, but there 
are two key discoveries within the field – loss aversion and psychic numbing – that are 
relevant for understanding why genocide architects choose mass atrocity and why 
potential third party interveners to stop genocide often do nothing. 
Numerous experiments in behavioral economics have found that, relative to a 
previously established status quo (or reference point) such as current political power or 
territorial control, a decisionmaker perceives her or himself to be worse off from a loss 
than an equivalent gain makes the person feel better off. This phenomenon is known as 
loss aversion. For example, if a political leader loses 100 acres of territory, the loss that 
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the leader experiences will be much greater than the gain the leader would experience if 
100 additional acres were acquired. What behavioral economists have discovered is that 
humans tend to “cognitively magnify” losses relative to equivalent gains beyond what 
standard rational choice theory predicts. Why is loss aversion potentially important for 
understanding genocide? Many case studies, theoretical models, and empirical studies 
of genocide posit that political leaders experience extreme pressure and even personal 
threat when they are losing an interstate war or losing control of their government to a 
rebel group. Such losses were characterized above as “existential threat.” Rational choice 
and game theory models predict that, under certain conditions, political leaders will make 
extreme choices, sometimes even mass killing and genocide, to secure their control. Loss 
aversion suggests that such extreme choices would be more likely and more pronounced 
than even rational choice theory predicts because leaders would cognitively magnify the 
implications of such losses.71 
Another critical discovery from behavioral economics, with important implications 
for genocide prevention, is psychic numbing. Based on extensive research on human 
cognitive and affective abilities (and inabilities), behavioral economists have discovered 
that people will often not care much more about large losses of life relative to small losses 
of life, and they may even care less. Slovic, et al. (2016) provide many examples of such 
psychic numbing including research that shows that people are less willing to send clean 
water to save lives in a refugee camp that was large (250,000) rather than small (11,000), 
people are more willing to donate money to Save the Children to feed an identified 
individual (a seven-year-old African girl named Rokia) than to donate to the same 
organization to help millions of Africans, and people are less willing to donate money to 
help two starving children than to help one. Slovic, et al. (2016) offer detailed analyses of 
psychic numbing and the importance of the phenomenon for understanding why individual 
citizens and political leaders in third party states that might intervene to help threatened 
populations seem complacent and prone to do nothing. These authors also provide 
                                                          
71 Midlarsky (2005, chapters 5, 7, and 18) and Anderton and Brauer (2016c) explicitly introduce loss 
aversion into a theoretical analysis of genocide choice.  
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numerous policy prescriptions for overcoming the problem of psychic numbing in 
genocide prevention policy.   
 Both loss aversion and psychic numbing can be pictured using variants of 
the famous S-shaped function from behavioral economics (Kahneman 2011, p. 282). In 
panel (a) of Figure 6, the S-shaped function moves from the lower left negative quadrant 
to the upper right positive quadrant. This panel applies to the decionmaking of a political 
leader who psychologically values the gain or loss of, say, territory. The vertical axis 
measures the psychological values associated with territorial losses (in the negative 
quadrant) and territorial gains (in the positive quadrant). The horizontal axes measures 
possible losses in territory (in the negative quadrant) and possible gains in territory (in the 
positive quadrant). Loss aversion is depicted in panel (a) in the following way: the 
psychological value of a loss in 100 acres of territory (measured by distance 0b) is much 
greater than the psychological value of a gain in 100 acres of territory (measured by 
distance 0a). This also holds for the psychological values associated with losses and 
gains of 200 acres (i.e., distance cd > distance ef). Hence, in panel (a) of Figure 6 the 
psychological value of losses is magnified relative to the psychological value of equivalent 
gains. 
 Psychic numbing is shown in panel (b) of Figure 6. The vertical axis 
measures the psychological value or importance of the loss of life to political leaders in a 
third party country, which might potentially intervene to protect victims of genocide. The 
horizontal axis measures the magnitude of losses of life. Psychic numbing is depicted in 
panel (b) in the following way: the psychological importance to third party political leaders 
of a loss of 10,000 lives in a nation experiencing genocide is measured by distance 0h, 
but the incremental psychological value of another 10,000 lives lost (out to 20,000 in total) 
is only the distance hi. Hence, political leaders in panel (b) care very little about additional 
losses of life. Moreover, given the near flatness of the curve at higher levels of fatalities 
(e.g., 50,000 and greater), the incremental value attached to further losses of life is 
virtually zero. Even more disturbingly, Slovic, et al. (2016) maintain that experimental 
evidence on psychic numbing cannot rule out the possibility that the curve in panel (b) 
turns down, which implies that third parties would come to care less (incrementally and in 
total) about a greater number of lives lost relative to a smaller amount lost. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Research on mass atrocities from the four social sciences summarized in this 
article, as well as important contributions from many other disciplines not covered here, 
is culminating in a truly multi- and inter-disciplinary effort to understand the causes of 
genocides and mass killings and how they can be prevented. Even across just the four 
social sciences covered here, scholars are employing a variety of tools and theoretical 
concepts, bringing to bear their own discipline’s comparative strengths in understanding 
genocide, and willingly drawing upon the ideas of other disciplines to enhance their own 
research effectiveness. Just one example of the fruitfulness of cross-pollinated research 
in genocide studies is how the choices of genocide architects and perpetrators can have 
rational motivations (as emphasized in economics), but also critically important 
nonrational elements as emphasized in sociology, social psychology, and political science 
such as the importance of social and cultural context, existential threat and loss aversion, 
cognitive and affective disabilities and psychic numbing, and the importance of status quo 
(or reference point) political power. I anticipate that over the coming decades there will 
be further integration and maybe even unification of the social and behavioral sciences 
regarding how people make choices, which in turn will help scholars and policymakers to 
better understand and prevent mass atrocities. 
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FIGURE 6 – S-shaped curve from behavioral economics illustrating loss aversion and psychic numbing  
 
Panel (a): Loss Aversion             Panel (b): Psychic Numbing 
 
 
 
SOURCES: Adapted from Kahneman (2011, p. 183) and Slovic, et al. (2016) 
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Meanwhile, in the world right now, mass atrocities are taking place. Moreover, 
future genocides and mass killings are being plotted right now in the minds of potential 
architects and perpetrators. The social sciences (and other disciplines) are stating very 
loudly that such atrocities will continue to occur until policymakers and citizens more 
generally come to fully appreciate that the rational and nonrational motivations for 
genocide and mass killing can be very strong in the minds of potential perpetrators and 
that the incentives for potential third parties to help victims can be stunted owing to 
human cognitive and affective limitations. The current challenge facing scholars, 
policymakers, and activists devoted to genocide prevention is how to integrate what 
has been learned about the causes of genocide, and will continue to be learned, into 
new and innovative policies to prevent genocide. Although the motives for genocide 
and mass killing remain strong in the world, we know more about the insidious nature 
and effects of such motives. One hopeful aspect of this otherwise disturbing reality is 
that incentives can be changed. Perhaps one day, the choice of genocide or mass 
killing can become incentivized to be as rare as it should be, which is “Never Again.”  
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